

THE CHANGING ROLES OF THE NEW ZEALAND
ARMED FORCES 1965-1980

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ABSTRACT

This thesis looks at the changing roles of the New Zealand armed forces from 1965 to 1980. It deals with four particular roles. The Alliance role, Territorial role, Regional role, and Civil role, and attempts to determine whether there has been any change in each role's particular operation and in the relative importance of the four roles overall.

Research for this subject consisted basically of a study of defence policy statements and opinions as put forward by political and military people and contained in such things as the annual Defence Report, the periodic Defence Review and newspaper sources. Representatives of each of the groups concerned with defence, politicians, civil servants and military personnel were interviewed in Wellington during 1979; also a study of the suitability of existing and proposed equipment for each of the four roles was conducted.

The main features that became apparent as a result of this study were: the influence of financial constraints as a primary determinant of defence policy; the inferior position of New Zealand's defence forces in comparison with those of other nations throughout the Asian-Pacific region; and an apparent downturn in the overall importance of New Zealand's defence forces implied in recent policy decisions and by the decline of military capabilities during the period between 1965 and 1980.

As well as this general trend in New Zealand defence there were also interesting trends within each of the four particular roles. The most significant aspect of the New Zealand armed forces today is the civil role. Without the services carried out by the armed forces, the country as a whole would be left in the difficult situation of having to provide these services from elsewhere. And the military would be left without a suitable justification for their continued existence on the present scale. In contrast to this, each of the other roles has been allotted less importance over the years.

The question of maintaining a military capability is a difficult one for New Zealand and many of the problems choices and decisions as they relate to the four main roles are looked at here.

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KEVIN J. COURTNEY, 1980

INTRODUCTION

The subject of defence is an important one for any country. In times of war and international unrest it takes precedence over all the other requirements of society. This is accepted by the population as being necessary and unavoidable if they wish their country to retain its independence and autonomy. In times when there is no such threat, however, and when the nations of the world are co-existing relatively peacefully the question of defence takes on a more delicate nature. Then it becomes one of "do we really need any defence at all and can we afford it?" It is not the aim here to decide what types of defence New Zealand requires, if indeed we need any at all. The assumption is that "so long as war lurks in the background of international politics, the question is not whether states require military power, but how much and what kinds of military power are most appropriate for achieving a given state's objectives."¹

Accepting this as being true for New Zealand, the aim will be to look at the types of defence roles considered necessary in New Zealand and the changes these have undergone in the fifteen year period between 1965 and 1980. The reasons for any noticable changes in priorities or importance will be sought as they relate to factors such as financial constraints, international influences,

¹Fred A. Sonderman, William C. Olson, David S. McLellan, The Theory and Practice of International Relations 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice Hall, 1970) p. 168.

political influences and so on.

The roles of the armed forces will be considered under four headings. These are: an alliance role, a territorial role, a regional role and a non-military or civil role. The alliance role refers to those activities of the armed forces that are directly related to alliance requirements. This would include such things as any capability New Zealand had to acquire either to fit in with our ANZUS allies, or else to remain credible in their eyes. The territorial role relates directly to those defence capabilities and objectives that are designed solely to protect New Zealand's land and sea area. This would involve such things as short range air and sea capabilities and permanent shore based defence establishments. The regional role is concerned with the part New Zealand plays in the South Pacific especially and also further afield in South East Asia. This includes training the armed forces of some of these countries and in some cases stationing troops in these countries. The fourth role is the non-military or civil role and is concerned with all of those services that the armed forces provide for the civil community that are not directly military in nature. Things such as search and rescue and fisheries protection.

All of the activities and duties of the armed forces can be seen as belonging to one of these four roles. Some may overlap two or more different roles but none should be completely separate to any of the four. By looking at each of these four in turn some indication of the relative importance of each over time may become

apparent. In this way it should be possible to determine what changes have taken place in the New Zealand defence scene between 1965 and 1980. The changes in relative importance may indicate a trend in defence which is likely to continue into the eighties and which has probably already been determined by equipment purchases and decision making during this period. The objective then will be to determine why these changes have occurred. Has it been in response to specific determining factors in the international sphere that have influenced the defence strategies of all small states, or has it been caused by domestic political factors? The means of discovering these causes and their influence on defence will be discussed further below.

The time period chosen, 1965 to 1980, or fifteen years may seem fairly short, but in the field of defence much can happen in fifteen years. Weapons can become obsolete, economic circumstances can change, and the balance of power, both in a regional and an international sense, can shift, amongst others. During this fifteen year period there have been many significant changes. Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union have eased, while Sino-Soviet tensions have increased.² Both American and British troops have withdrawn from South-East Asia, especially since the end of the Vietnam war, leaving something of a super-power vacuum in the Asian Pacific region. There have also been advances in the accuracy and range of the weapons, both nuclear and non-nuclear, possessed by

² 1978 Defence Review (Government Printer : Wellington) p. 5.

the increasing numbers of developing military powers. In the immediate New Zealand area, the 1977 introduction of a 200 mile economic zone, the independence achieved by many South Pacific nations, the declining economic situation and the end of conflict in the region have been some of the significant changes.

Studying this period also means that three Defence Reviews can be compared, those of 1966, 1972 and 1978. This, along with a study of other official statements will enable a comparison to be made of policy throughout the period. The most obvious aspects of defence policy during this period have been the gradual decline in defence spending as a percentage of the total government spending coupled with a decline in spending on capital equipment, the involvement of New Zealand troops in Vietnam between 1967 and 1971, and the end of conscription in 1972 as a result of the coming to power of a Labour Government. These and many other factors will be considered as part of the study of changes in defensive roles during this period.

Before going any further it is necessary to look at New Zealand's position in the overall world situation and the influence this will have over any decisions relating to defence. New Zealand exhibits all four of the characteristics that East uses to determine whether a country can be described as a small state. These are

"(1) small land area, (2) small total population, (3) small total GNP and (4) a low level of military capabilities." 3

³ Maurice A. East, Stephen A. Salmore, Charles Herman (eds.) Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Policy Studies (Canada/Beverly Hills : Sage Publications, 1978), p. 557.

New Zealand also exhibits several other characteristics which, while not common to all small states, can have an important influence when they are present. These are a democratically elected government, a very low level of perceived threat, either from internal or external sources, and a general ^{un}willingness on the part of the population as a whole to advocate extensive or even moderate military growth. These factors combined with the low GNP and the rapidly escalating costs of modern military equipment contribute greatly towards any decisions on what type of military posture or readiness to adopt.

As a small state New Zealand also exhibits several other characteristics common to such nations. These include:-

- (a) low levels of overall participation in world affairs,
- (b) high levels of activity in inter-governmental organisations,
- (c) high levels of support for international legal norms,
- (d) avoidance of the use of force as a technique of statecraft,
- (e) avoidance of behaviour and policies which tend to alienate the more powerful states in the system,
- (f) a narrow functional and geographical range of concern in foreign policy activities,
- (g) frequent utilization of moral and normative positions on international issues. ⁴

All of these factors have an influence over the conduct of New Zealand's defence strategies.

Many of them are obvious. For instance, "the small state because it is small has an exceptionally slim margin of safety or security - in terms of both space and

⁴East, et al., p. 563.

time."⁵ Whereas a larger power can push conflict away from its boundaries a small power must fight at its vital boundaries. Also, because of the smaller resources of a small power a given fraction of the GNP will yield less than would be the case in a larger state. The end result of these factors is that whilst a small state might desire greater defence capabilities it often has to settle for less than it feels is sufficient.

As far as the other characteristics are concerned New Zealand can also be classed as a typical small state. One noticable indicator concerns 'the frequent utilization of moral and normative positions on international affaires'. The New Zealand action - or more specifically, the Labour Government's action - in sending the frigates Canterbury and Otago to observe the French nuclear testing at Mururoa in 1974 provides a perfect example of this. New Zealand also conforms to the other general characteristics. Our general conformity to super-power desires, an increasing concern with events in our own geographical region and the other factors such as low participation in world affairs and support for legal norms all place New Zealand as a small power. While all small powers are different in their own ways it must be accepted that this will be a major determining factor in so far as their defence policies and attitudes are concerned.

In looking at the defence situation in New Zealand, particularly as it existed during the fifteen years from

⁵David Vital, The Inequality of States : A Study of the Small Power in International Relations (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 59.

1965 to 1980 it is necessary to look at all of the important influencing factors and their relative influence.

These factors can be divided into two basic groups. One, those determinants in the international environment that are likely to influence New Zealand policy making. And two, those factors in the domestic environment that are likely to influence policy-making particularly as it relates to defence.

The international factors include the overall political situation, and the economic situation especially. During this period the political situation has undergone changes in so far as it relates to New Zealand and otherwise. As previously mentioned United States/Soviet relations have improved to a stage where they are probably less likely to lead to conflict now than at any other time since the second world war. Sino-Soviet relations have obviously taken a downward turn during this period but they appear to be stabilised at present. Along with this improvement in relations, conflict in the Asian Pacific region has ended and together these factors mean that there are less obvious threats to New Zealand in recent times than there have been previously. Specific factors that relate directly to defence roles such as alliance requirements will be dealt with more closely later. However it is important to remember that one of the most significant international determinants of New Zealand's defence situation is our membership of ANZUS. The international economic situation has also had an influence in so far as New Zealand's defence is concerned. Apart from the obvious

factor that inflation has put the increasingly complex and expensive modern weapons systems almost beyond the reach of smaller states such as New Zealand, there is also a broader role played by economic factors in New Zealand's situation. As the 1978 Defence Review said, "the problems this country is now facing are economic rather than military."⁶ It is against a background of increasing economic changes that "New Zealand must reshape its defence policy." Factors such as Britain joining the European Community, the increased prosperity of the South East Asian countries and difficulties with the oil producing countries are all significant in this respect and will become more apparent throughout this study.

As well as these external influences on the New Zealand political scene and therefore on the defence scene, there are also significant domestic factors that are important in determining the priorities that will be accorded to the New Zealand defence scene overall and to various aspects in particular. The major domestic factors are, broadly speaking, political and economic. As far as political factors are concerned a major development during this period was the change of government in 1972 and the resultant changes brought about by this. The most obvious change was the end of conscription, introduced soon after Labour came to power in 1972. This effectively altered the whole makeup of the New Zealand armed forces, taking

⁶ 1978 Defence Review, p. 5.

⁷ Ibid.

them from a base force of 12,992⁸ men, which could be supplemented by a potential civil component in times of need of many thousands, to a situation whereby they consisted of a 12,670 man⁹ base force and a smaller voluntary territorial force that could be mobilised when required. The Labour Government also undertook a slight downgrading of the armed forces reducing their share of the GNP from 2.0 per cent in 1972¹⁰ to 1.7 per cent in 1975.¹¹ The Labour view was that "there was no threat to New Zealand, therefore it was hard to justify any increase in spending."¹² They did, however, accept the fact that "the main thing was to have a base force on which any building could take place when required."¹³

Although the Labour Government was replaced by a National one in 1975 there was no reversion to the previous system of conscription and in fact there was no stepping up of defence spending to its previous level. Therefore the 1972 to 1975 period saw the beginning of significant changes in New Zealand's defence base. As will be seen in a later chapter the reluctance of the New Zealand people to support any increases in defence spending has resulted in changes taking place in the pattern of defence spending in that more emphasis would seem to be placed on civil service type duties. The politicians

⁸Report of the Ministry of Defence, 1971, p. 16.

⁹Report of the Ministry of Defence, 1975, p. 16.

¹⁰New Zealand Year Book, 1974, p. 267.

¹¹New Zealand Year Book, 1976, p. 258.

¹²Interview with Arthur Faulkner, 12 December 1979.

¹³Ibid.

of course, must be seen to be using the armed forces as effectively as possible.

Political changes or decisions in New Zealand's domestic scene therefore have had significant influences on defence factors. Many political moves result from economic factors since the economic situation is an important determinant of defence related factors as well as many other elements of society. The most obvious economic element of modern defence is the cost of providing the armed forces with sufficient quantities of up to date weapon systems. Here four main trends play a significant part:¹⁴

- (a) the rising cost and technical complexity of high grade weapons systems,
- (b) the rising absolute and proportionate cost of research and development,
- (c) the rising optimum scale of production of modern weapons,
- (d) the high element of risk and uncertainty attached to the design process, production and employment.

Because of these factors modern weapons systems are very expensive especially since no small state can afford to or has the resources to produce them for themselves. It requires the expenditure of vast amounts of overseas funds to develop and maintain an effective military force.

Coupled with the great and increasing costs involved and the relatively poor and deteriorating economic circumstances of New Zealand. New Zealand's balance of payments situation in 1964-65 was ~~-\$~~28,350,000,¹⁵ whereas by 1978 it had become - \$715,800,000. It is against this back-

¹⁴Vital, p. 153.

¹⁵New Zealand Year Book, 1979, p. 636.

ground that the defence budget must be arrived at, and probably as a result of this decline in the economic situation, spending in defence as a percentage of the GNP has declined from 2.1 per cent¹⁷ in 1965 to 1.68 per cent in 1977.¹⁸ These then are the important influencing factors on any country's defence policies. Both external factors such as the potential threat and internal factors such as the economic situation play an important part in the overall question of defence requirements and roles. This will hopefully become more apparent as each particular defence role is looked at in turn.

In the case of each of the four roles the aim is to compare their individual positions at the start of the 1965-1980 period and again at the end in an effort to see to what extent each role has developed or declined during this period. If it appears that there has been significant changes in the priorities accorded to a certain role then the reasons for this will be examined. Any change in the relative importance of the four roles will be studied also. A conscious attempt to develop one role at the expense of one or more of the others will be a significant indication of changes in defence policy and the reasons behind this will be vital to the conclusions that will be reached.

It is not possible to have access to all the decision-making processes of the defence policy makers but it is possible to study many of their decisions and their

¹⁷New Zealand Year Book, 1974, p. 267.

¹⁸Report of the Ministry of Defence, 1979, p. 26.

consequences and often the information on which these decisions have been based will also be available. This is how this study will be conducted. It will use a descriptive base and an attempt to develop this into a broader discussion of policy-making approaches and consequences. Important sources of this information will be the annual defence reports, the periodic defence reviews, official statements to the media and personal interviews with some of those intimately connected with the whole question of New Zealand's defence. By comparing policy objectives and their implications, in so far as equipment purchased and capabilities achieved are concerned, an indication of the changing priorities and roles of defence may be obtained. Before beginning this it is perhaps useful to briefly discuss several important elements of defence today, elements that are particularly relevant in the New Zealand situation.

The whole question of defence is an arbitrary one for any nation. There are no set down criteria specifying exactly what capabilities a certain sized nation requires to successfully deter an attack from a certain sized aggressor. There are so many factors involved in such a calculation, such as the geographical location and size of both parties, the alliance involvements of both parties, the type of weapons operated by both parties, the training of the armed forces, the logistical support and so on, that any statement about one nation's defensive position in relation to another is completely arbitrary.

It is for this reason that defence provides such a

headache for any nation and any Government. The Government must decide what degree of threat exists, whether their own forces are capable of resisting it and if not whether it is possible to develop sufficient forces to resist it, and if it is possible is it economically and politically justifiable. The impossibility of successfully deterring all potential aggressors especially for a small state means that the steps are generally a compromise solution. This is especially the case when there is no obvious threat or when the only apparent threat is so great as to be undeterrable.

Probably the main reason for maintaining a military capability is tradition. This would certainly be the case in New Zealand. Where an army, navy and air force has existed for some time and a base force of skilled personnel exist, the policy of any Government is likely to be one of retaining this capability, but in a very limited way. There has been no country in the world who has willingly disbanded its armed forces in the past thirty years. Yet the situation has changed dramatically for many of these countries including New Zealand. Once a country possesses a military capability it tends to retain one although in many cases, especially where the level of direct threat is low, the size of the armed forces bears no relation to the size of any possible threat.

For these reasons, the state of the armed forces in New Zealand during the past fifteen years and the indications of the future levels, will not be looked at as

indicative of peculiar New Zealand policies. They will be analysed with these points in mind. The traditional existence of a military capability, the existence of no direct threat, and the impossibility of deterring all potential threats whatever the expenditure on defence, are all factors that must be accepted in any study of New Zealand defence policies.

These then are the aims, and the level of analysis that will be adopted in this study of the New Zealand defence situation, particularly as it existed during the late sixties and the seventies, but also in so far as the developments during this period have affected the future development and structure of the New Zealand armed forces.

CHAPTER II

THE ALLIANCE ROLE

One of the most significant aspects of New Zealand's defence situation during the period 1965 to 1980 has been the role of our allies and the importance of our alliances. In common with any small state that wishes to provide efficiently for its defence, New Zealand has had to become particularly reliant on assistance from allies and most especially from a major power, in this case the United States. While not a desirable situation, it is becoming increasingly necessary.

Whatever the reasons and despite the dangers both internal and external of becoming very dependent militarily on a major power nearly every one of the weaker countries is in some ways tied militarily to at least one of the major powers. ¹

New Zealand is no exception. Even if New Zealand diverted much more of her GNP to defence purposes we still would not be able to provide a force capable of providing a suitable deterrent to attack. It costs no less to defend a poor country than it does a rich country. No less to defend a sparsely populated country than a densely populated country, and no less to defend a small country than a large country. In actual fact the lack of population and size probably make New Zealand more difficult to defend especially with our long shoreline and vast ocean area. If New Zealand wishes to provide for its defence its only valid option

¹Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relations (New York : The Free Press, 1972), p. 275.

is either a collective security agreement with other such countries or else an alliance with a major power.

This chapter will look at the alliances to which New Zealand belongs and the various commitments and obligations contained there within. It will look especially at the requirements needed to maintain a credible membership in each and determine whether New Zealand's armed forces actually meet these requirements. Any changes in the alliance situation during this period will be discussed along with possible causes. The objective basically is to see how important the alliance role of the armed forces is in relation to their other roles and in relation to New Zealand's needs.

The basis for this analysis will be a study of official perceptions and statements as contained in newspaper releases and in official publications such as the annual Defence Report and the periodic Defence Reviews. An analysis of the types of equipment purchased during this period will also shed some light on the official priorities and strategies in relation to alliance factors.

The three alliances in question here are the Australia, New Zealand, United States alliance (ANZUS), the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the Five Power Defence Arrangements. Looking at each of these in turn, ANZUS is a multi-lateral security treaty between New Zealand, Australia and the United States. It was signed in San Francisco in 1951 as part of a system of interlocked security treaties related to the Japanese peace treaty. Other parts of the system included a mutual defence

treaty between the Philippines and the United States, and a security treaty between Japan and the United States. The treaty imposes obligations such as the obligation under article II: for the parties "to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity of self defence,"² and the obligation under article III; "to consult whenever in the opinion of any party there is a threat to the political independence or security of any of the parties."³ Articles IV and V contain the obligation to "act to meet the common danger in the event of an armed attack in the Pacific area on any party."⁴ Despite these obligations there is no criteria set down concerning exactly what steps each country should take in its own defence, nor is there any specific point prescribed at which one country should come to the aid of its allies.

SEATO was similar to ANZUS in that members were required to "separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self help and mutual aid maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability."⁵ Again there was no specific obligation to attain a specific level of defence capabilities nor an obligation to come to the aid of a threatened member. Members were merely required to consult to conside

² J.G. Stark, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance (Melbourne : Melbourne University Press, 1965), p. 69.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ The SEATO Treaty.

the situation.⁶

SEATO has been virtually defunct as an alliance since 1977 with the specifically military aspects being downgraded since 1974. The Manila Pact still remains in existence. Originally SEATO consisted of New Zealand, Australia, France, Pakistan (until 1973), the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States, along with three protocol states, Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam.

The Five Power Defence Arrangements involve New Zealand, Australia and Britain in the protection of Malaysia and Singapore. They replaced in 1971 the earlier Australia New Zealand and Malaysian agreement (ANZAM). These state that "in the event of any externally organised or supported armed attack or threat of attack against Malaysia or Singapore, the five governments would consult together for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately."⁷

This alliance differs from the others in that it does not contain the deterrent power consistent with American membership but rather relies on the collective security of several countries headed by the far distant Britain. Also it is not a collective agreement providing for the security of all members. It is a means of Britain, New Zealand and Australia reaffirming their support for Malaysia and Singapore. Like the other two, it does not directly oblige any member to commit themselves in the event of an attack on

⁶The SEATO Treaty.

⁷The Military Balance 1977-78, p. 55.

Malaysia or Singapore. They are merely obliged to discuss the situation. There is also no specific defence level that Malaysia and Singapore should reach to assist in their own defence, nor any capabilities that must be maintained by their protectors Britain, New Zealand and Australia.

The question to be answered is, what is required of the New Zealand armed forces if New Zealand wishes to remain to be seen as a credible member of these alliances? Is there any specific requirement seen as essential by the other members, and by the New Zealand Government, and how far do the armed forces go in attaining this requirement?

The alliances themselves do not contain any specific requirements but it is possible to distinguish a minimum level of capability necessary to remain as a credible contributor to each alliance. An important requirement would be that the members including New Zealand show a willingness to become involved when the situation warrants it. New Zealand has shown this willingness on two occasions. The first was in relation to the Malaysian problem in the early fifties when New Zealand troops made up part of the Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve. This situation occurred before the 1965-1980 period, but the consequences remained throughout the period, and to this day New Zealand troops remain in Singapore. This involvement occurred originally under the auspices of ANZAM and after 1971 came under the Five Power Defence Arrangements. In 1971 Britain withdrew its forces from South East Asia leaving Australia and New Zealand to ~~except~~ a greater

responsibility in the region. All Australian troops and most New Zealand personnel have also now withdrawn from Malaysia and Singapore.

The other occasion on which New Zealand has proved willing to become involved in support of its allies was in Vietnam in the sixties. Here New Zealand troops fought alongside their American and Australian allies in support of the government of South Vietnam. However

the decision by each government to commit forces in 1965 was unquestionably taken in furtherance of SEATO obligations. 8

South Vietnam was, of course, a protocol member of SEATO. The decision was discussed at both SEATO and ANZUS meetings and it must be considered that New Zealand's involvement also had much to do with our membership of ANZUS. All three ANZUS members fought in Vietnam whereas many SEATO members did not. During the Vietnam war New Zealand was represented by artillery and infantry units from 1964 until 1971. Some training units remained after this but they were recalled in 1972 after the Labour Party came to power in New Zealand. At the height of our involvement in South East Asia in 1968 New Zealand personnel in the area totalled 1,344.⁹

These have been the two occasions on which New Zealand has openly come out in support of our alliance obligations, although on both occasions they represented only a very small percentage of the total forces involved

⁸ Alan and Robert Burnett, The Australia and New Zealand Nexus (Canberra : Institute of International Affairs, 1978), p. 93.

⁹ Report of the Ministry of Defence, 1968, p. 5.

in the actions. As well as showing a willingness to support our allies in times of crisis New Zealand must also show a willingness to maintain her armed forces in a state of readiness and with suitable equipment in case any need for their commitment occurs in the future. In Vietnam New Zealand relied entirely on the United States and to a lesser extent Australia for all logistical support as well as for much of their equipment. The situation was similar in Malaysia. New Zealand will obviously never be able to provide fully for its logistical requirements and in fact the force is designed to fit into our allies forces as an integrated part, rather than a completely independent national unit, in the event of another Vietnam situation. Despite this, however, New Zealand is expected to maintain some credible force as part of its overall alliance commitments.

Just recently President Carter has "called on the United States' allies in Europe, Asia and the Pacific to join with us in increasing their defence efforts."¹⁰ The Australia response has been to announce a 13,000 strong increase in the size of their armed forces and an additional \$1,360M spending on defence in the next five years.¹¹ Thus taking the defence budget to 3 per cent of the GNP in comparison with New Zealand's 1.7 per cent. They have also announced the deployment of the aircraft carrier 'Melbourne' along with an accompanying task force, to the Indian Ocean. New Zealand's response has been merely to announce the

¹⁰ The Press, Thursday 31 January, 1980.

¹¹ The Press, 26 March 1980.

implementation of various projects outlined in the Defence Review, and to provide naval and air support "as resources permit."¹² This is fairly indicative of New Zealand's attitude throughout the period 1965-1980. On the one hand sentiments such as "for the alliance to be worthy of the trust we repose in it we must be ready to contribute our share,"¹³ are expressed. While on the other hand no concrete efforts are made to ensure New Zealand is capable of playing a significant part in either ANZUS or the other alliances.

To be capable of a credible response to any reasonable alliance commitments New Zealand would require greater levels of equipment and more up to date equipment, such as aircraft, ships, anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft missiles and so on. This would not necessarily involve massive expenditure, but rather a steady expenditure over time, until New Zealand had acquired a minimal level of suitable response capabilities. At present New Zealand's ability to respond to any alliance duty must be considered extremely limited.

As a result of President Nixon's Guam doctrine in 1969, which initiated a retreat from forward defence by the Americans, New Zealand and Australia have been required to accept more responsibility for their security in the South Pacific and in the Asian Pacific region. This need was also brought on by the British withdrawal from South East Asia in 1971. New Zealand's total involvement in this area consists of the battalion in Singapore, and Mr Muldoon himself

¹² Christchurch Star, Thursday, 28 February 1980.

¹³ Defence Review, 1978, p. 16.

said "the chief advantage of maintaining the New Zealand battalion in Singapore is the effect it has on recruitment for the army,"¹⁴ also there is no suitable accommodation for the troops in New Zealand. The surveillance activities of the Orions and frigates which these days are increasingly concerned with New Zealand's own exclusive two hundred mile zone. And the limited troops and equipment present in New Zealand, which could be flown in limited numbers to any minor trouble spot in the South Pacific.

Despite the restricted nature of New Zealand's alliance capabilities President Carter has stated "how valuable we consider the relationship to be between our nation and New Zealand and Australia."¹⁵ He said "there could not be a stronger friendship and alliance or partnership in facing rapidly changing circumstances than that between the United States and Australia and New Zealand."¹⁶ This is inspite of the fact that New Zealand has at times actually seemed to go against the aims of ANZUS. An example of this was the Labour Government's desire to create a 'nuclear free zone' in the South Pacific. A draft resolution was submitted to the United Nations in 1975, which Australia supported to some extent but did not co-sponsor.¹⁷ A nuclear free zone would in effect banish all American ships from the South Pacific since the United States do not reveal which ships are nuclear armed. The Australian Defence Department said that "New Zealand's efforts to pro-

¹⁴Christchurch Star, 7 September 1976.

¹⁵Christchurch Star, 28 February 1980.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Alan and Robert Burnett, op cit., p. 267.

mote a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific are detriment to Australia's security interests. The United States has recently made clear its objections to the nuclear free zone proposal and its dissatisfaction that an ANZUS ally should persist in a course which the United States has declared harmful to its interests there are some New Zealand attitudes on defence matters which impose some limits to the co-operation between Australia and New Zealand on strategic and defence matters."¹⁸ This occurred under the Labour Government and when the National Party returned to power soon after they reaffirmed their approach to ANZUS:

We fully accept that membership of the ANZUS Alliance entails both rights and obligations. Unlike the previous Government we consider the idea of a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific to be not only impracticable in today's world, but unrealistic insofar as it could hinder the provision of the defence assistance upon which we would depend in a major emergency. ¹⁹

There is no doubting the desire particularly on the part of a National Government to remain under the protection of the United States. What does remain doubtful is the extent to which they are prepared to assist in their own protection. It is interesting in this respect to compare figures of defence spending for all members of the alliances to which New Zealand belongs. (See Table 2.1

These figures deal with 1971, a time when British and American involvement in South East Asia was ending. It was also a time almost in the middle of the 1965-1980

¹⁸ Sydney Bulletin, 12 June 1976, p. 5.

¹⁹ Report of the Ministry of Defence 1976, p. 5.

TABLE 2.1

Defence Spending for the Year 1971

Country	\$ Millions	\$ Per Head	% GNP	No. Armed Forces
Pakistan	714	14	4.2	395,000
Thailand	260	7	3.9	150,000
Philippines	136	3	1.8	31,000
France	5,202	101	3.1	500,000
United States	78,742	378	7.3	2,391,000
New Zealand	124	43	1.7	12,637
Australia	1,261	97	2.9	88,110
United Kingdom	6,108	109	4.7	372,331
Singapore	158	73	6.3	17,100
Malaysia	186	17	4.3	50,500

period. The general rankings remain the same today.

Countries such as the United States and Britain of course only had a very small proportion of their forces in the Asian Pacific region at any time and France had no representation. What is immediately apparent is that New Zealand's spends the least on defence and as a consequence has the smallest armed forces. As a percentage of Government spending New Zealand's defence budget is also the smallest. The actual size of the armed forces would not matter greatly if they were equipped with modern, sophisticated weapons but this is not the case in New Zealand.

How far is New Zealand capable of contributing to these alliances? This refers primarily to ANZUS but the Five Power Arrangements are also still important, and the

Manila Pact still exists, although not in its original military sense. New Zealand has proved in the past capable of contributing to the Five Power arrangements or to be more precise ANZAM. This contribution was however limited and only useful as a small part of the total contribution. Today New Zealand's contribution could not hope to equal that of any other members. Its only advantage would be that New Zealand troops would be able to respond to any emergency more quickly than British forces if there was a sudden crisis. Most probably though there would be consultations and warning beforehand and even this advantage would disappear. The presence in Singapore, while more than either Britain or Australia provide, is totally insignificant in the overall scheme of things. Even the likelihood of New Zealand wishing to become involved in any crisis in Malaysia or Singapore must be questionable. This particularly relates to trouble resulting from internal problems, but could also refer to external intervention. The Australian view is that "we do not expect or want our forces to be engaged in any activities there of local origin. If it were a matter of people coming in from outside or an obviously outside-inspired movement, then the case might be different although after Vietnam one could not be sure."²⁰ New Zealand is therefore incapable of making any significant contribution to the Five Power arrangements apart from training troops from Malaysia or Singapore and contributing to exercises and so on. Throughout the period 1965-1980 therefore the armed forces role in

²⁰ "Changing Face of Defence," The Listener, 29 May 1972, p. 7.

relation to the Five Power arrangements has declined although this pattern is similar to the other allies as well, since the situation in the area has improved to a stage where further unrest appears unlikely in the foreseeable future. Along with this though it must be accepted that New Zealand is less capable today of contributing to this alliance than we were in the fifties and sixties.

SEATO is less significant now than earlier in this period, and there would be no obligation for New Zealand to aid a fellow member of SEATO. There are no longer SEATO exercises nor a combined planning and decision-making body so the strategic significance of SEATO is unimportant. New Zealand's armed forces role in conjunction with SEATO has therefore declined as has their ability to conduct such a role.

The most important alliance role of the New Zealand armed forces is in relation to ANZUS. This is a two-sided role. On the one hand, it is very important, since our membership of ANZUS and our apparent contribution to it provides New Zealand with its chief source of protection from any outside threat. On the other hand, it may be less significant to the actual operations of the armed forces, since the effort devoted specifically to the alliance role is limited. The equipment purchased during this period has not been of the type specifically required for alliance duties although New Zealand does not have limited resources of the type needed to play a viable part in the on-going aspects of our alliance role. These include an anti-submarine capability provided by the frigates, especially

Canterbury and Waikato, a surveillance capability provided partly by the frigates, and more specifically by the Orions and a support capability for United States ships operating in the South Pacific. This is nowhere near as well developed as the harbour facilities provided by the Australians and which are being improved further. Australia also provides the United States with the Pine Gap communications centre in the Australian North West Cape. There is no equivalent United States establishment in New Zealand.

Where New Zealand lacks the resources to contribute adequately to the ANZUS alliance is in the event of an outbreak of hostilities against any of the members, including New Zealand. New Zealand's effective counter measures for an invasion against any party are very restricted. They amount to short range, almost obsolete fighters, two frigates for a massive area of coast line and ocean, eventually, limited capability, light weight tanks, and troops with a restricted array of low firepower ~~weapons~~. While New Zealand is capable of carrying out some functions in support of ANZUS in times of peace, we are not able to perform any significant functions in times of hostilities.

The important thing is that realistically New Zealand could not be expected to play any significant part in a major conflict. An increase in defence spending would eventually increase our capacity to take part in surveillance duties and so on, but it would be virtually impossible for New Zealand to develop the resources required to play a major part in most hostilities. What our allies would expect and what New Zealand often does not undertake is a

development of the capabilities we possess at present. This would on the one hand provide a functional service both for New Zealand and the alliance, and also create a force, albeit a token one in some respects, that would justify us retaining membership of ANZUS and the protection of the United States.

The alliance role of the armed forces is crucial to New Zealand, not so much in itself, but rather because of the advantages it obtains for New Zealand. It is a difficult role to develop and co-ordinate since it may seem insignificant in the immediate sense, however in the long run it should continue to provide security and play an increasingly important part in New Zealand foreign policy and defence policy.

CHAPTER III

THE TERRITORIAL ROLE

Any country in the world is primarily concerned with protecting itself against intrusions from outside. These intrusions usually come in either an economic or a military sense. Economic threats can not always be diverted but military threats can be diverted if suitable precautions are taken. The method adopted by many countries to guard against aggression is by forming alliances as was seen in the previous chapter. This is, however, a secondary approach which attempts to deal with a problem not directly but in a round about sense. The only direct way of preventing aggression is to physically stop it, by developing a strong self-defence force. This is of course difficult for countries that do not have a massive GNP, and even if a complete defence against conventional attack is developed there is still the chance that a nuclear threat may develop. Territorial defence therefore creates a particular problem for nations especially small states. They must decide just how far to develop this particular resource and what methods to use. These decisions are influenced by the degree of potential threat and the special characteristics of the country involved, such as economic considerations, geographical factors and political factors.

New Zealand is one of many nations that cannot completely protect itself from aggression, due to economic

factors such as an inadequate GNP, geographical factors, a very long coast line, and political factors - no obvious threat, therefore a reluctance to devote resources for this purpose. This chapter will look at the extent to which the New Zealand armed forces are used in a territorial defence role, what reasons they possess for this role and whether this role has developed or declined during the period 1965-1980. The basis for this analysis will come from a study of official statements in Defence Reviews and Reports and so on and from the equipment used by and purchased by the armed forces during this period. There will be some overlap in parts between territorial and alliance related operations and duties but this should not be too restrictive in the overall analysis.

The best way of approaching this subject is by first of all determining what would be required to adequately protect New Zealand and then seeing just how far the armed forces go in providing these capabilities. New Zealand of course cannot completely protect herself but some viable level of territorial defence capabilities should be defined. Other roles such as the regional role and most especially the alliance role contribute to New Zealand's overall territorial defence, but in the last respect any nation's security comes down to its own ability to defend itself.

Very briefly, a nation's ability to defend itself can be determined by its ability to provide the following capabilities:

- (1) An advance warning system, comprising both shore based radar and reconnaissance aircraft;

(2) An air defence capability comprising both land and sea based surface to air missiles and all weather interceptor aircraft;

(3) An anti-aircraft capability comprising surface to surface missiles, and also an anti-submarine capability;

(4) An army equipped with anti-tank and anti-personnel weapons as well as suitable transport facilities.

These would be the minimum requirements needed to deter any aggression. The need is of course to deter any aggressor rather than actually be capable of defeating them.

No small state can in itself constitute a major target of great power policy but only one which is secondary to a more important object. If the price of exercising military pressure against it can be raised high enough, other, less costly means of achieving the major object will be preferred. ¹

Forming alliances with larger powers is usually used as a method of deterrence, but ultimately it comes down to a nation's own self-defence capability.

Potential aggressors are hard to find in New Zealand's case. The Defence Review does not foresee any potential threat to New Zealand, but says that if a threat was to eventuate it would result from a "shift in the balance of forces in the Pacific Basin."² Without elaborating, it is hard to envisage just who might be expected to threaten New Zealand. The two possibilities are a major power, such as China or the Soviet Union, or a smaller nation, such as Indonesia. While many Asian Pacific nations possess superior

¹David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 153.

²Defence Review, 1978, p. 14.

military numbers and equipment to New Zealand it should be remembered that to have any chance of success an invading force would generally need to be three to four times the size of that of the defenders. This would tend to rule out serious threats from any of the smaller nations.

The assumption is that any attack on New Zealand will be conventional in nature, since a nuclear threat could not adequately be deterred anyhow. In the event of a conventional attack it can be assumed that large numbers of men with massive support facilities would be needed to threaten a defended New Zealand and that these forces would be required to cross vast expanses of ocean. In the second world war

it took 200 ships - many of them large - to land 20,000 men of the 7th Division in Borneo - and 1,700 to put ashore the U.S. invasion force of 250,000 in the Philippines. 3

This shows the magnitude of such a task. It now remains to be seen what the New Zealand armed forces are doing to ensure any such invasion would be suitably contested. This will be done by looking at each of the four basic requirements in turn, to see how far they are fulfilled by the New Zealand armed forces.

The first of the four is a forward warning system of both shore based radar and reconnaissance aircraft. In New Zealand's case this consists mainly of the airforce Orions which provide a limited reconnaissance capability. The Defence Review states that the Air Force needs to retain the capability to detect, identify and report

³Max Teichmann (ed.), Aspects of Australia's Defence (Melbourne: The Political Studies Association, Monash University, 1966), p. 69.

surface and sub-surface activities throughout the maritime areas of direct interest."⁴ With the increased restrictions of flying hours, introduced as a fuel saving measure in the mid seventies, and the predominant use of the Orions for Search and Rescue and resource protection duties, their capability for reconnaissance is limited. Also there are only five P-3B Orions⁵ and at any one time no more than three are likely to be in the air. Therefore, their ability to provide New Zealand with up to date information concerning movements in the area of interest must be questionable.

The other requirement, a radar capacity, to detect airbourne and also surface activity throughout the area, is completely lacking. New Zealand has no early warning system of its own and relies completely on information provided by allies from satellite and surface observations. It also relies on the assumption that any attack on New Zealand will be preceded by a lengthy build-up of forces and a long sea voyage which would hopefully again be spotted at an early stage by our allies. As far as this first desired capability for territorial defence is concerned, therefore, New Zealand falls well behind the required levels.

The second requirement to be considered is an anti-aircraft capability. Any attack would most probably be spearheaded by a two-fold air operation. One, an air strike on vital defence installations, and two, an airlift of troops to make the initial assault. It is therefore

⁴Defence Review, 1978, p. 37.

⁵Military Balance 1979-1980, p. 70.

necessary to have some defence against a threat from this source. To what extent is this provided for by the armed forces?

New Zealand has no land-based anti-aircraft capability at all. This is in contrast to Australia who has only recently taken delivery of a further 12 rapier SAMs (Surface to Air Missiles) and 10 blindfire AD (Air Defence) radar.⁶ Previously they had 8 rapier SAMs. The New Zealand frigates are all equipped with SAMs, however they could hardly be used as flak ships. The Skyhawks are equipped with an air to air capability, but they are not designed for this type of role, being primarily ground support aircraft. Their chances of surviving even limited combat with any enemy aircraft would be minimal. New Zealand has no true all weather interceptor aircraft nor does it have any other significant anti-aircraft capability. This crucial capability of any territorial defence force is therefore almost completely lacking amongst the New Zealand armed forces.

The third criteria is an anti-shipping and anti-submarine capability. This is usually provided by both an air and sea capability. As far as air defence against shipping and submarines is concerned New Zealand is reasonably well equipped. The Orions can seek out and destroy submarines while the Skyhawks are able to operate against shipping and can carry air to surface missiles. The problem is that these air capabilities may not be appropriate in the face of a large scale attack. For one thing

⁶Military Balance, 1979-1980, p. 63.

the airfields from which these aircraft operate may well have been put out of action before a sea-going target is sighted. Also, the New Zealand aircraft would be unable to penetrate any air escort provided for shipping. They would also be vulnerable to the sophisticated SAMs likely to be carried by any naval force.

New Zealand's sea-going defence against naval intruders is provided solely by the three operational frigates. While they are capable of detecting and possibly destroying submarines, especially when assisted by aircraft, the likelihood of three frigates covering the whole New Zealand ocean area adequately is remote. Their usefulness against well armed and probably numerically superior surface forces is limited. They are designed primarily for their anti-submarine role and for escort purposes not to engage other warships. Therefore, while the New Zealand armed forces are to a limited extent able to provide this capability, here again they lack the essential resources to do the job properly.

The fourth and last essential requirement for territorial defence is an adequate and mobile army. The New Zealand army is reasonably mobile. This is provided by armoured personnel carriers, trucks and, to a lesser extent, helicopters and aircraft such as the Hercules and Andovers. They are not, however, capable of deploying in strength to any area in New Zealand at short notice.

Mobility is, of course, only one aspect, the main requirement is suitable and plentiful firepower. It is rather pointless being able to rush troops to a danger spot if

they have not got any suitable weapons to take with them. In New Zealand's case fire power consists primarily of light to medium artillery and small arms capabilities. There will, of course, be the addition of the Scorpion light tank in the near future. Its value, however, would be restricted to operations against poorly equipped infantry, since it could not possibly engage other tanks, nor could it survive any confrontation against infantry armed with anti-tank weapons. This again contrasts with the Australians who possess the Redeye anti-tank system, as well as over 100 Leopard medium tanks. Without the light and mobile anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons designed for use by the individual infantryman, the overall effectiveness of the New Zealand army is very limited in the event of an intrusion in force against New Zealand territory.

As can be seen by looking at each of these four required fields of military capability, New Zealand lacks the resources to be able to adequately fulfil the role of territorial defence. It is possible that a very limited threat may be repelled by the existing forces and resources, but any threat to New Zealand is likely to be far greater than that that could be provided by a country the size of say Fiji. It would therefore appear that the territorial role is not one which receives a lot of importance or effort in so far as equipment is concerned anyway. The important concern now is to determine why this apparent lack of concern for the territorial role has developed if in fact it has, and to see just how this role has

changed during the period 1965-1980.

It has already been accepted that New Zealand could not hope to adequately provide for its own territorial defence. Neither, for that matter, can Australia or virtually any other small country in the world. What is important is that some effort be made in this area, for two reasons. Firstly it is important in so far as our alliance situation is concerned. If an invading power completely over-ran New Zealand in a very quick time and with little resistance, then it would be more difficult to persuade our allies, particularly the United States, to become involved. Where a confrontation situation has reached an apparent conclusion it is more difficult for outside powers to become involved than it would be where hostilities are continuing. Therefore it is important for New Zealand to be able to delay and resist any aggressor for long enough to enable the United States to become involved. Another element of this alliance situation, as previously mentioned in the chapter dealing with this area, is that New Zealand is required by ANZUS "to maintain and develop her individual and collective capacity of self-defence."⁷ If this capability is not developed then our allies, Australia and the United States, may decide that they are not obliged to assist New Zealand in the event of any attack on our territory.

The second consideration is that if some form of deterrence can be developed then a potential aggressor may decide that the costs of any aggression would be so high

⁷ Stark, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance, p. 69.

as to be unacceptable. Even the apparent protection of any ally such as the United States is no guarantee that an aggressor will not consider the risks worth taking in particular circumstances. In actual fact an alliance with the United States may well provide a reason for some nation opposed to the United States to get at them by attacking one of their allies, New Zealand. Some suitable type of territorial defence, no matter how totally effective, is therefore essential for any small state.

This factor has apparently been accepted by the Governments throughout this period, at least in so far as their stated aims in the Defence Reviews are concerned. The first objective in the 1966 Defence Review was to "preserve the security national interests and independence of New Zealand and the island territories for which it is responsible."⁸ However, in the later section concerning the missions of the armed forces there was no specified desire to become directly capable of defending New Zealand territory. The nearest any desire came to this was "contributing to the protection of sea and air communications vital to New Zealand."⁹

The 1972 Review was similar to this and in 1978 the objection still remained similar, the

preservation of the security and integrity of New Zealand itself: our land, our air space, our 12 mile territorial sea and our newly established 200 mile exclusive economic zone. 10

⁸ Defence Review, 1966, p. 5

⁹ Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁰ Defence Review, 1978, p. 15.

The acceptance of this policy objective was said to impose the following general requirement

The provision of forces capable of quick response to any threat to New Zealand itself, of controlling the adjacent economic zone, and at the same time of upholding New Zealand's wider national interests in our area of prime concern - the New Zealand region and the South Pacific. 11

The desire to contribute to territorial defence, however vague was apparent in the Reviews. As has been seen above this desire has not been translated into the required capabilities. New Zealand is barely capable of detecting and arresting fishing boats operating illegally in our waters, let alone being capable of quick response to any threat to New Zealand itself. During this period no equipment purchases have really had any major effect on this capability. The frigates, Skyhawks and the proposed tanks, all contribute to some small degree to territorial defence, but there has been no integrated and co-ordinated development of specific territorial defence capability. The ability to carry out this role may well have even declined during this period; if the increasingly sophisticated weapons possessed by our potential enemies are considered.

One of the reasons for the apparent decline in the capability to carry out this role has been the increased complexity and expense of modern military equipment. It would be necessary for a country to modernise its defence capabilities every time its enemies developed further their offensive capabilities. This is obviously not

¹¹Defence Review, 1978, p. 15.

possible for New Zealand. Also, purely defensive equipment such as anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons have no use in other fields such as civil operations or even at times in alliance or regional operations.

Another important aspect of the territorial defence role is that it should actually have increased in importance, even if this is not acknowledged by apparent priorities. This increase in importance has been brought about by the changing defence strategies of the major powers. Until the beginning of the seventies the United States operated a policy of forward defence, best exemplified by their presence in Vietnam. As a consequence of this policy American troops and also British troops, because Britain also followed this policy in the early days, were stationed in the Asian Pacific region, thus providing for New Zealand's forward defence as well as their own. With the withdrawal of firstly the British presence, which was completed by the early seventies, and then the United States withdrawal as a consequence of Nixon's 1969 Guam Doctrine, which was finalised not long after, New Zealand lost her forward defence protection which had been provided by these powers. Since then New Zealand has been responsible for her own defence but this has not resulted in any extra emphasis being accorded to the territorial defence role.

The only possible conclusion to reach then is that whereas our contributions to territorial defence should in actual fact have increased during the period 1965-1980, given the circumstances existing, they have actually

decreased, both as a part of the armed forces total duties and in so far as New Zealand's total defence capabilities are concerned. This situation is perhaps understandable, considering New Zealand's economic situation and the lack of any apparent threat to our security in a military sense. Whereas the Civil Role, Alliance Role and Regional Role all have benefits outside their direct military purpose, the territorial Defence Role is restricted to its purely military purpose and as such can appear unattractive to the Government when deciding how defence funds should be distributed.

At no stage has Government policy included a desire to achieve a certain standard of self-sufficiency in defence or at least provide a significant territorial defence force without relying on allies. The role, whilst existing to some extent, is not seen as being significantly separate from the regional and alliance roles. While to a large extent it is equated with these roles, it should be seen as being at least partly separate, since any nation needs some form of independent force for its own self-protection.

It must be remembered though that the question of territorial defence is a delicate one. It cannot be looked at in isolation since New Zealand's primary defence strategy is one of 'collective security'.¹² If New Zealand was to achieve the virtually impossible situation of complete territorial security then the need for the ANZUS alliance would disappear since New Zealand would be in a

¹²Report of the Ministry of Defence 1968, p. 4.

position of armed neutrality. This would make New Zealand independent in a military sense and able to deter all likely aggressors. This is of course an unlikely situation since New Zealand does not possess the economic base necessary to produce the expensive equipment needed for such an option. To maintain a policy of armed neutrality New Zealand would need to develop an indigenous defence industry, none of which exists today, and also would have to achieve a strong external trade situation so that the economy would not be subject to pressure from other nations.

It is not possible therefore for New Zealand to ever hope to have a satisfactory form of territorial defence. If indeed it is possible for any nation whatever its size and resources to ensure themselves of completely foolproof territorial defence. It is a question therefore of achieving a degree of territorial defence suitable for the needs of a nation, in this case, New Zealand.

New Zealand exists in such a situation that the provision of territorial defence is difficult^t if not impossible. Geographically and economically New Zealand would find it hard to adequately fulfil this need. For this reason the territorial role, although important for the reasons discussed, must be acknowledged as being somewhat less significant in the overall defence scene than some of the other roles. The alliance role particularly is significantly more important to New Zealand than the territorial role. In New Zealand, as in most small states, it is by contributing to alliances usually

involving a major power, rather than by more direct measures, that territorial security is best achieved.

CHAPTER IV

THE REGIONAL ROLE

New Zealand is a part of several regions, ranging from, in the narrowest sense, the South Pacific region to, in a broader sense, the South East Asian or Asian Pacific region and further afield again, the massive Pacific Basin community. Obviously our sense of belonging to, and identification with, each of these regions will vary as we turn from the narrowest to the widest sector. New Zealand is primarily involved with the more localised South Pacific region. In relation to this region we could be described as a large fish in a large ocean whereas in relation to the other further afield regions we are definitely a somewhat smaller fish in a very much larger ocean.

Our involvement with the South Pacific associates us with several vastly different countries, both in a geographical and cultural sense. Australia is, of course, our largest neighbour and our partner in matters concerning the South Pacific. Apart from New Zealand and Australia "the islands range from New Guinea with a land area of 975,000 square kilometres and a population of 3,000,000 to the Tokelau, with a total of ten square kilometres and a population of 1,700."¹ Excluding Australia, New Zealand, West Irian, and Hawaii, Oceania contains "a population of about 4,000,000 and a land area of less than 650,000 square kilometres,

¹Ian Wards (ed.), New Zealand Atlas (Wellington: Government Printer, 1976), p. 192.

divided amongst several hundred islands scattered over one third of the earth's surface."² It is therefore a diverse and well spread region. It is also a developing region. Since the early sixties many of the nation states within the region have attained levels of independence. Western Samoa in 1962, the Cook Islands, 1965 (internal self-government), Nauru, 1968, Fiji and Tonga, 1970, Papua New Guinea in 1973 and more recently Tuvalu, Kiributi and the Gilbert Islands have all undergone changes in status during this period.

Further afield New Zealand is increasingly concerned with the countries of South East Asia. One reason for this is the increased importance of these countries to New Zealand's trade, especially since the United Kingdom joined the EEC in 1973. Between 1972 and 1977 New Zealand's exports to the ASEAN countries increased from \$52 million to \$129 million.³ Also during the period under consideration there was major unrest in several South East Asian countries, actually involving New Zealand in a war between 1967 and 1971 in South Vietnam.

To maintain our position as a dominant part of the South Pacific and as a respected neighbour in South East Asia, New Zealand obviously needs to have a suitable military capability to add some strength to its position. To what degree do the New Zealand armed forces fulfil this requirement, what has been their role in respect to the South Pacific and South East Asia during the period 1965-1980 and

²Wards, op cit., p. 192.

³New Zealand Yearbook 1978, p. 549.

has there been any apparent change in this role?

In examining this role there will, by necessity, be some overlapping with other roles, in particular the alliance role and also to some extent the civil role. This is unavoidable since such aspects as Vietnam are undeniably important to both roles. South East Asia will be examined firstly with consideration to both directly military roles and less military orientated roles. The South Pacific will then be looked at under the same headings.

The most significant event during this period has been the withdrawal of all British and American troops from South East Asia, leaving these countries virtually to fend for themselves. There are of course no signs of any trouble arising nor have there been for some years now, therefore there was no reason for these outside troops to remain. Without these troops though, what is required of the New Zealand and also the Australian armed forces in respect of their role of providing for the protection of this region? For one thing, it should be realised that many of the countries in South East Asia possess far more extensive military forces than does New Zealand.⁴ Therefore the level of direct military assistance that New Zealand can provide for these countries is limited.

Our major defence arrangement as far as South East Asia is concerned lies in the Five Power arrangement, backed up of course by ANZUS. SEATO is now much less meaningful. ⁵

As far as these agreements are concerned New Zealand is

⁴Refer to Table 2.1.

⁵"The Changing Face of Defence in New Zealand," The Listener, 29 May 1972, p. 7.

responsible to some extent for coming to the aid of our neighbours should we decide it is required.⁶ During the period 1965-1980 New Zealand has come to the aid of, or already been aiding, two separate South East Asian countries. Since the fifties New Zealand has maintained a military presence in Malaysia and from 1967 to 1971 maintained a presence in South Vietnam. As far as the requirements of these aspects of the regional role were concerned, all New Zealand had to provide was troops and a limited amount of equipment, the major pieces of equipment and all logistical support were provided by our allies, the United States, the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent, Australia. These days with the withdrawal of the United States and Britain and the improved military position of many of the South East Asian countries the regional requirements have changed. New Zealand in a military sense and in very simple terms requires the following capabilities if it wishes to make a significant, if limited, contribution to regional security:

(1) medium range air and naval transport capabilities and associated escort facilities,

(2) medium range naval and air force, strike and interception capabilities,

(3) some degree of commonality of equipment with allies. Also familiarity with allies' operating procedures and equipment,

(4) suitable equipment such as easily transportable anti-aircraft, anti-tank and anti-personnel weapons, and

(5) considerable logistical support for troops operating many miles from their home base.

⁶ Refer to p. 17.

As far as these requirements are concerned New Zealand is only partly capable of contributing to regional security in a solely military capacity. While we possess limited transport capabilities we do not possess suitable escort capabilities. For example, the range limitations of the Skyhawks would prevent them from escorting Hercules or Andovers. At sea the frigates provide an escort capability but there are no ships to escort, therefore they have to carry troops themselves, which restricts their own operations and would not involve many troops anyway. New Zealand also possesses no medium to long-range air force interception capabilities and has limited naval capabilities for this role. The degree of commonality of equipment is not great. For instance, New Zealand operates A-4K Skyhawk fighters, Australia F-111C's and Mirages, Singapore Hunter FGA74's, Indonesia CA-27 Avon Sabres and so on.⁷ The only country with any aircraft similar to New Zealand's is Singapore who operates Skyhawks amongst their other types. Also, while SEATO exercises used to provide opportunities to train with other armed forces, these opportunities are now limited. Lastly, the New Zealand armed forces possess virtually no suitable equipment or logistical support. They would be totally reliant on Australia and any other countries involved and they would be unlikely to be able to cater to all of New Zealand's needs.

It is therefore apparent that New Zealand's regional role is not particularly centred on providing direct military assistance, in relation to South East Asia. Rather the role

⁷The Military Balance 1979-1980, pp. 63-72.

of the New Zealand armed forces in relation to this region is centred on the provision of other forms of assistance. Since these countries often have greater military capabilities than does New Zealand, our armed forces contribute to Government foreign policy by providing such things as specialised training for military personnel from these countries and exercising with some of these nations. During 1977 personnel from Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand all received training from New Zealand instructors, while Malaysia and Singapore also took part in exercises in New Zealand.⁸

There is also a great deal of other work carried out by New Zealand military personnel throughout South East Asia. This usually involves civil tasks such as disaster relief or engineering operations, etc. In developing countries there are often no resources available to construct roads as New Zealand engineers did in Thailand⁹ or to clean up after cyclones or hurricanes, floods or earthquakes and so on, all of which New Zealand military personnel have had to contend with during this period. This type of operation benefits New Zealand foreign policy and our relations with these countries in South East Asia as much as would the presence of a large New Zealand military.

Up until now discussion has focused on the New Zealand military's role in relation to South East Asia. This is just one area of regional involvement and probably a more significant area concerns their involvement in the South

⁸ Report of the Ministry of Defence 1978, pp. 6-7.

⁹ Report of the Ministry of Defence 1969, p. 18.

Pacific, a region far closer to New Zealand and one containing more dependent nations.

Whereas the military's involvement in South East Asia is relatively insignificant in a strategic sense, the value of the New Zealand and Australian military presence is much more significant to the nations of the South Pacific. None of the small states in the South Pacific possess an adequate military force of their own and they all rely almost totally on outside assistance especially from New Zealand and Australia in the immediate term. The military's involvement in the South Pacific takes two approaches. Firstly the direct military assistance and protection role and secondly the training and civil assistance role. The first role, direct military protection for the area, is not manifest in a continuous military presence in the region, at least not a land based presence, anyway, but is rather based on the assumption that should any threat occur to an island state such as Tonga or Fiji, then New Zealand along with Australia would act to meet it. New Zealand therefore sees itself as a protector of the South Pacific states, and in the unlikely event that some threat should occur to them, would be able to do more to assist than they would if a South East Asian state was threatened.

Where New Zealand military involvement in the South Pacific is most apparent is in the less militarily orientated roles of disaster relief and so on. The New Zealand armed forces are almost continuously involved in either emergency operations or on-going civil assistance operations in the South Pacific. The most recent example of the former has been Cyclone Wally which struck¹² Fiji on April 4th 1980

causing massive devastation. Air Force Hercules from New Zealand were dispatched with helicopters, equipment and personnel.¹⁰ This is just one example of a string of such operations throughout the period 1965 to 1980. An example of the on-going type of operations conducted as part of the Governments bilateral aid plan has been the surveying of harbours in Tonga.¹¹ Perhaps the best description of the armed forces involvement in the South Pacific is contained in the 1978 Defence Review which says

They enable us to give the island states of the Pacific help of a kind they want when they want it. 12

This has been a description of the requirements involved in providing different forms of assistance to both the South Pacific and South East Asian region, and the actual role played by the New Zealand armed forces in this region. The objective now is to determine whether the overall involvement of the armed forces in these regional roles has changed significantly during this period and if so why such a change has occurred.

In terms of actual numbers and type of operations involved, it would appear that the regional role has declined during the period. In the late sixties and early seventies New Zealand troops were actively involved in the Vietnam war, prior to this they had been concerned with the situation in Malaysia. Today the only remnants of this concern for South East Asia would be the battalion stationed in Singapore.

¹⁰ New Zealand Herald, Monday, 7 April 1980.

¹¹ Report of the Ministry of Defence 1978, p. 13.

¹² Defence Review 1978, p. 7.

The significance of this battalion to present day New Zealand defence strategy can not be said to be overly important. Also there has been no significant stepping up of the more civil orientated operations such as emergency services. Therefore it would seem, without doubt, that the regional role of the armed forces has been declining significantly throughout the seventies. Also the reasons for this decline would appear to be quite obvious, in that they stem from the changes in the international situation as it pertains to this area of the world. There is no longer a disruptive conflict occurring in the area, there has been a withdrawal of outside forces and the whole area has returned to a position of relative peace. Because of these factors New Zealand's direct involvement in the region has therefore declined, or so it would seem.

Despite this, however, it could well be said that perhaps the regional role of the armed forces has actually grown in importance. The reason for this being that the importance of New Zealand to the region has actually increased, therefore the importance of the regional role of the armed forces must have increased. The reason for the increased importance of New Zealand in the South Pacific and also South East Asia stems from the fact that, with the withdrawal of both Britain and the United States from South East Asia, there is no longer any outside presence anywhere in the region. New Zealand's Singaporean battalion could be said to have assumed greater importance since it is the only remnant of the once substantial Five Power forces in Malaysia and Singapore, and the American ~~forces~~ throughout South East

Asia and makes New Zealand the only outside power with troops stationed anywhere in South East Asia. This is of course ridiculous since these troops remain principally to suit domestic New Zealand requirements.¹³ The overall argument though does have validity. In Vietnam the New Zealand contingent was at no time more than a small percentage out of the total forces involved. While in Malaysia, New Zealand's contribution provided only a small part of the Commonwealth force. During these times, therefore, New Zealand's presence was virtually insignificant, however with the withdrawal of these British and American troops, New Zealand's presence, even if primarily contained within our own shores, assumes a far greater significance.

With the American withdrawal from South East Asia - as a result of the Guam Doctrine of 1969, which ended the policy of forward defence - and the British withdrawal in 1971, the countries of the region were left to cater for their own defence. This has resulted in nations such as Singapore,¹⁴ Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia and so on all developing their own capabilities much further. As a result of this, while there is no direct threat to the area at present, the level of preparedness is greater than ever before on the part of the nations of the region.

It is interesting to compare defence spending by some of the nations of South East Asia and the South Pacific at the time when the general withdrawal of foreign troops took

¹³ These domestic requirements are the lack of suitable accommodation in New Zealand and the value the Singapore base has for army recruiting.

¹⁴ Singapore 1975, Ministry of Culture, Singapore 1975, p. 87.

place and seven years later in 1978-79.

TABLE 4.1

Defence Budget
(\$U.S.)

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1978-79</u>
Australia	1,261,120,000	2,970,000,000
New Zealand	123,704,000	313,000,000
Indonesia	272,000,000	1,470,000,000 ('79-80)
Malaysia	186,000,000	693,000,000
Philippines	135,500,000	793,000,000
Thailand	260,300,000	940,000,000 ('79-80)
Singapore	158,170,000	410,000,000
Fiji	N.A.	3,600,000

Source: Compiled from Military Balance 1972-3 and 1979-80.

These figures are, of course, influenced by inflation, but they do show the degree to which defence efforts have been improved. The trend then since the early seventies has been for the nations of South East Asia and also of the South Pacific to rely far more on themselves and each other for their defence. Although SEATO has virtually come to an end there is just as much, if not more, regional spirit and co-operation apparent than ever before. This would be true of New Zealand as well as the other nations in one sense at least. The stated desires and objectives of the Government indicate a greater concern for the region than ever before, however this is tempered with the realisation that "New Zealand can play no significant part in the area".¹⁵

¹⁵Defence Review 1978, p. 18.

As was seen earlier New Zealand's military capability to contribute significantly to the defence of the South East Asian region has never been great and this is unlikely to change much in the future. It can still be said though that with the withdrawal from the area by Britain and Australia, New Zealand's role has increased, if not in a direct military capability, then in an economic and regional co-operation sense. The armed forces are important in both these respects.

Although the actual contribution of the armed forces to South East Asia may not have increased, the military's involvement in the South Pacific has almost certainly been developed during the period. With the continual worry that outside interests may take an increased interest in the island states of the South Pacific in an economic and strategic sense,¹⁶ it has become important for New Zealand to show an interest in the protection of the area. This has been developed by such actions as supplying some of these nations with weapons and other equipment¹⁷ by training their personnel and in the case of Fiji by providing a leader for their armed forces.¹⁸ The operations of New Zealand's frigates, Orions and various other units are often centred around surveillance of the South Pacific since this is in the interests of both the countries of the area and also of New Zealand itself, since invariably any threat to New Zealand will either occur via the Pacific islands or

¹⁶The Evening Post, 24 April 1979.

¹⁷New Zealand Herald, Thursday, 10 May 1979.

¹⁸Ibid.

else result from a decline in the economic and political stability of any of these nations which could allow in the influence of outside powers.

Whereas in the past New Zealand's concern has centred around events many thousands of miles away, usually in Europe, and our battles have usually been fought in France or Belgium or some other foreign land, the period 1965 to 1980 has seen a change in this pattern. In recent times our attention has turned more to our backyard, the South Pacific, and our own neighbourhood, South East Asia. The interest and concentration on these areas of the world has probably never been greater than during the period 1965-1980. It has been indicated by our military presence in Vietnam and Malaysia, the first time a New Zealand army's prime concern has been a war so close to New Zealand, and by our increased presence in and assistance to the island states of the South Pacific.

The reasons for this change in emphasis on New Zealand's part could be seen as partly natural progression or in a sense regression, partly due to the British joining of the EEC and their withdrawal from South East Asia, partly because of the United States withdrawal from the region and partly because of the increased concern for the region in a trade and strategic sense. While this increased concern may not have been accompanied by increased spending (in a relative sense) on equipment and on direct military aid, it has been expounded in military policy and priorities. The regional role of the armed forces has remained important throughout this period, therefore, and while culminating in actual

military involvement in Vietnam and Malaysia has nevertheless remained important since then. The probable increase in this role has occurred through a declining direct concern with affairs further afield and through an increased economic interest in the region. Where economic interest is present military interest must also be present, at least where practicable.

CHAPTER V

THE CIVIL ROLE

While the main roles of the armed forces are undoubtedly those concerned with territorial defence, regional defence and alliance commitments, there is one other role. One that is not considered of primary importance, yet which may actually occupy a great deal of the military's time. This is the non-military or civil role, and often this is the role for which the military are considered most useful. In times of peace it is more common to associate the armed forces with such things as search and rescue, disaster relief and general emergency operations than with more obviously military occupations. This is the case in many countries around the world since it is generally only the armed forces that possess the manpower and technology usually required in times of emergency. Seldom do other organizations possess such extensive equipment and skills.

The object of this chapter is to determine just how important this non-military role is in New Zealand. Both in relation to the other roles of the armed forces and in relation to the broader needs of the community. The aim is also to determine whether the relative importance of this role has changed during the period 1965-1980. Evidence for such a change would come primarily from official statements such as in the Defence Reviews and annual Defence Reports and also from newspaper sources. Equipment

purchased and authorized for purchase during this period would also give some indication of relative importance, since some equipment is suited to both military and civil functions, while other types are designed solely for military uses. Obvious decisions in favour of one type or the other would certainly be significant. If it appears that there has been some change in the relative importance of this role during the period then some explanation will be sought for this. The most likely reasons for any change would probably stem from related changes in the domestic political environment, the international situation, economic circumstances, personality factors and general small state characteristics. These are the areas of importance to be studied in relation to the civil role of the New Zealand armed forces.

The significance of the military's contribution to the community in various roles is certainly nothing new. Throughout history the armed forces have been involved in assisting the community in ways often quite separate from their defined roles. The extent of this community involvement on the part of the armed forces has, however, changed over time. Originally soldiers were specialists, trained and reserved solely for the purpose of fighting wars and crushing rebellions. This was possible since there were typically vast numbers of unemployed, unskilled people available in times of emergency or disaster. The only means of responding to such situations was of course with manpower since the limited technology available precluded any other response. Gradually over time though this

situation has changed. The costs today of maintaining a standing army, in a state of readiness for war, have become prohibitive, especially in times of continuing peace. Also in times of emergency often the only body of men trained and equipped to respond quickly and effectively are the armed forces. It has therefore become increasingly necessary to utilise the armed forces and their expensive equipment in the most efficient way possible. This has resulted in their being used in emergency situations, rather than developing a separate organization to provide the same service. The military have also adopted several more routine roles, such as fisheries protection duties, which are necessary in situations where the Government cannot afford to develop a specialist coast guard force, while at the same time maintaining an under utilized navy.

New Zealand, being a small state, finds it increasingly difficult to develop and maintain a satisfactory military capability in these times of rapidly rising costs and inflation. While inflation and balance of payments problems make it difficult to spare the money for military purchases the increasing level of technological complexity involved in military equipment and its rapid obsolescence makes its cost increasingly prohibitive also. Add to this the high costs of providing accommodation and wages, and it becomes difficult for any Government to justify military development, particularly when that Government is democratically elected and responsible to the populace for its actions, and when there appears to be no direct threat to New Zealand's sovereignty. This is the situation with which

New Zealand has been faced, particularly in the later years of the period 1965 to 1980. How has it affected the operations of the military in so far as their civil duties have been concerned.

As would be expected in a small state with limited resources and an under utilized military, the armed forces have been utilized in various ways to provide a service for the community and to justify their existence. These areas include search and rescue, both on land and at sea, disaster relief, both in New Zealand and overseas, particularly in the South Pacific Region, fisheries protection originally within the twelve mile limit and since 1977 throughout the two hundred mile economic zone, general transport duties both across Cook Strait and to overseas destinations and various other forms of assistance to the civil community ranging from hydrographic research to training assistance to the aviation industry.

The first point to look at is just how important the civil role of the armed forces is, both in relation to the armed forces other roles and in relation to the general needs of the community. As would be expected the military themselves consider the non-military role to be of little importance. As Lt. Gen. Thornton, the Chief of Defence Staff from 1967 to 1972, put it:

The military exist to exert violence against enemies and while they say they can be used for civil defence, search and rescue and civil aid this is not the reason for having them. ¹

This is, of course, true of any armed forces the world wide.

¹ Interview with Sir Leonard Thornton, Chief of Defence Staff 1965-1972, Friday 14 December 1979, Wellington.

It is, however, interesting to compare this view with that of a politician, Arthur Faulkner, the Labour Minister of Defence from 1972 to 1975, who said the military "are there to serve a political purpose"² and since the politicians do not very often have a conflict situation for the military to solve then presumably this political purpose is often civil in nature.

Generally the uses of the military for civil purposes can be divided into two distinct areas. One is services at home which will be looked at later, and the other is services abroad which function as aids to the Government's foreign policy. The Government's use of the military to assist in foreign policy usually takes in peaceful roles such as disaster relief, in response to cyclones or other natural disasters throughout the South Pacific region, or on occasions, further abroad. An example of this was in 1972 when "extensive assistance was given by the RNZAF to the Fiji Government and the Gilbert and Ellice Administrations following Hurricane Bebe."³ During this operation over 500⁴ hours of flying time were clocked by the Air Force. The Government also provides on-going assistance to various countries in the South Pacific and further abroad. For several years ending in 1971 army engineers were involved in constructing a 144 kilometre long road in Thailand.⁵ There have also been numerous operations in the Pacific

²Interview with Arthur Faulkner, Minister of Defence 1972-1975, Wednesday 12 December 1979, Wellington.

³Report of the Ministry of Defence, 1973, p. 5.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Report of the Ministry of Defence, 1972, p. 6.

Islands including reef demolitions, harbour building, road building, and so on. This form of assistance to these nations is just as beneficial to New Zealand's overseas standing as is direct military intervention as in South Vietnam and Malaysia. Invariably it involves the military in operations for which they are not directly designed, but for which they prove ideal. The role of the armed forces therefore in the furtherance of Government foreign policy during this period has not necessarily been restricted only to their operation in Malaysia and South Vietnam, or anywhere else where their prime concern has been military intervention.

Along with their overseas duties in response to Government policies the armed forces are also used extensively in non-military roles at home. Again in accordance with the Government's policy. As with their international operations the internal operations of the military are also split into two distinct areas. One an on-going involvement in fields such as fisheries protection, and the other being in continuous readiness to respond to any unforeseen occurrence.

The importance of the navy's role in patrolling the two hundred mile economic zone is unquestionable. The sea is one of New Zealand's major resources and it is crucial that this resource be adequately protected. When the twelve mile economic zone was first established in 1966, New Zealand's ability to patrol this region was limited, consisting primarily of the minesweepers Inverell and Kiama, and several 1942 and 1944 vintage harbour patrol craft,⁶

⁶ Janes Fighting Ships 1974-1975. Captain John E. Moore (ed.), Janes Yearbooks, London, p. 242.

with occasional assistance from aircraft and frigates. As the period progressed these craft became less and less seaworthy and were restricted to certain coastal waters. Not until 1974 when the first of four Lake class patrol craft, Rotoiti and Pukaki were received and followed a year later by the Taupo and Hawea,⁷ did the navy's ability to adequately protect our ocean resources improve. It was, however, still limited, especially when the new two hundred mile economic zone came into force in 1977. To assist with the patrolling of this new greatly enlarged area the frigate Taranaki was converted to fisheries protection duties and more use was made of aircraft. However, to date no adequate method of enforcing our claims to our 200 mile zone has been developed and this is an area where the navy and also the air forces influence can only increase in importance. There would certainly be some basis for saying that of all the armed forces rôles and sub-rôles none has exhibited a need and desire for expansion equal to that of the fisheries protection role. It is the one role where the Government realises a greater capability is needed and has made various moves throughout the period to achieve this.⁸

The search and rescue role is one shared equally by all three services although it is probably most significant to the airforce. While it is really a role where the services respond to unexpected occurrences it is of such a magnitude that it is virtually an on-going concern, especially for helicopter pilots. The importance of this role can be seen

⁷ Report of the Ministry of Defence, 1976, p. 16.

⁸ Defence Review 1978, p. 28.

best by looking at some of the figures of man hours and flying hours involved. While these figures are not consistently available for all the various missions throughout the period, those that are available give some insight into the time involved.

TABLE 5.1

Year	Air Force Flying Hours in Search and Rescue	Army SAR exercises & operations	Navy SAR operations
1968	503	9 exercises, 21 emergencies	17
1969	425	7 and 21	-
1970	272	7 and 8	-
1971	270	14 and 14	18
1972	500	-	-
1973	450	13 emergencies	-
1974	n.a.	-	-
1975	430	35 emergencies	5
1976	400	-	-
1977	410	32 emergencies	-

Source: Compiled from information contained in Defence Reports 1968 to 1977.

Despite the gaps there is sufficient depth to give some indication of just how much time is involved in Search and Rescue, particularly for the air force. It must be remembered also that every flying hour would translate into many more man hours. The air force's flying hours do not show any strong trend throughout the period, being subject to distortion by excessively long operations at times. The

number of army SAR operations, though, does not appear to be on the increase, although again these figures vary greatly from year to year.

Search and Rescue is a very important part of the military's activities both from the point of their own time and equipment involved and also in so far as its value to the civilian community is concerned. There is no other organization that either does or could provide a similar service. If the armed services were not available to nor prepared to provide this service, then it would either not exist at all, or else it would have to be provided completely from scratch by the Government. A very costly proposition indeed. The importance of the Search and Rescue role of the armed forces is therefore certainly immense.

These are the two non-military type roles most apparent to the community as a whole. There are, however, various others. Two of these are provided by the navy. One is hydrographic research, which until 1975 was conducted by the HMNZS Lachlan. Since 1978 it has been carried out by the HMNZS Monowai, which was previously the island trader Moana Roa.⁹ The other is ocean research which is provided by the HMNZS Tui, previously the United States Navy ship, Charles H. Davis.¹⁰ As a result of the operations of these two vessels and their predecessors, many thousands of miles of ocean bed and shore line have been charted and surveyed. Providing information invaluable to both naval and civilian users alike. In 1967 the Hydrographic Supplies

⁹ Report of the Ministry of Defence 1978, p. 16.

¹⁰ Janes Fighting Ships 1974-1975, op cit., p. 242.

Department distributed 23,761 charts and 977¹¹ navigational books both overseas and in New Zealand. By 1976 these figures had risen to 55,140 and 4,504¹² respectively.

The air force also provides many important services for the civil community. One of these has been the carrying of cars and passengers across Cook Strait in 1971, 1976 and 1979 to remove the backlog created by rail ferry strikes. The air force, using six aircraft, flew 308 flights and carried 1,448 passengers and 694 cars¹³ across Cook Strait during November 1971. Another occasion on which the military have been involved in a strike situation was in relation to the Lyttelton tunnel dispute of 1979 when the army was called in to re-open the tunnel.¹⁴ This was, however, an unusual situation and the armed forces have stated that they will not be used for blatantly political purposes.¹⁵

Returning to the air force, though, one of their most common duties is to fly personnel and equipment to isolated islands and countries to conduct research or disaster relief operations. During 1976 the air force flew to Niue, Fiji, Katmandu, Dacca, Calcutta, Burma, Tonga, Western Samoa and Raratonga¹⁶ as part of the Government's aid programme. They also flew to many New Zealand locations or possessions.

¹¹Report of the Ministry of Defence 1968, p. 17.

¹²Ibid., 1977, p. 13.

¹³Ibid., 1972, p. 15.

¹⁴The Press., 26 March 1979.

¹⁵The Evening Post, 19 April 1979.

¹⁶Report of the Ministry of Defence 1977, p. 10.

Another role was that introduced at the start of this period with the arrival of New Zealand's first Hercules, and which has increased ever since, has been the flights to Antarctica every summer in support of New Zealand's Antarctic programme. This is a developing role which only commenced at the start of the period under consideration and which has grown greatly in importance. New Zealand's interest in the Antarctic has been made possible by the transport and communication provided by the air force:

Between the 9th of November and the 9th of December 1977, two Hercules aircraft based in Christchurch flew 9 return flights to McMurdo Sound transporting 287,700 lb of equipment and 237 personnel. 17

The interest in this area of the world is growing all the time and the airforce's role will certainly grow even further.

The army are also involved in many operations related to the civil community. In 1975, for instance, they were involved in a total of 500 separate activities representing 5,000 man hours.¹⁸ By 1977 this was 363 projects taking 6,500 man hours.¹⁹ Although corresponding figures are not available for all earlier years, this does give a very good indication of just how much the army interact with society, at large. The types of activities the army are involved in include such things as bomb disposal, engineering operations both at home and abroad, and also general functions such as transport, cooking, security and so on.

This look at some of the role of the armed forces as

¹⁷ Report of the Ministry of Defence 1978, p. 13.

¹⁸ Ibid., 1976, p. 11.

¹⁹ Ibid., 1978, p. 14.

they assist the civil community, has shown just how extensive their assistance is and just how important, and in most cases, irreplaceable it is. It has also, to a limited extent, looked at the changes in the scope and importance of this civil role throughout the period from 1965 to 1980. It is now time to look even deeper into the important question of whether the civil role of the armed forces has increased or decreased in importance during this period. Once this has been done it may become necessary to explain why these changes have taken place, and what the indications are for the future.

The easiest aspect of the armed forces civil involvement to study for changes during this period is the fisheries protection role. While many of the other activities occur in response to events that are uncontrollable and unpredictable, the fisheries protection task continues unaffected by unpredictable elements. It quickly becomes apparent that this task has certainly increased in importance, predominantly because the economic zone has increased from 12 to 200 miles. The introduction of new patrol craft and the transfer of a frigate indicate the increased importance of this role in the eyes of the Government. The 1972 Defence Review stressed that preparations for major hostilities were receiving less emphasis than in 1966, while more resources were being devoted to maritime surveillance and fisheries protection.²⁰

²⁰Defence Review 1972, p. 23.

Other aspects of the civil role also achieved greater significance during the period 1965 to 1980. The 1978 Defence Review stated that one of the major defence policy objectives was the "supplying of defence capabilities in support of the needs of the New Zealand society."²¹ It also stressed the requirement of "making use of trained, mobile and self-sufficient defence forces to provide on request, military assistance, technical aid, surveillance of outside activities, search and rescue, and disaster relief services in the South Pacific", and "maintaining a capability for limited support of national research and other interests in Antarctica."²² These desires were apparent throughout the latter part of the period in question, with the increased use of military resources and personnel in areas such as overseas aid projects, internal transport, and areas of assistance to the community other than those of an emergency nature.

Whereas some of the reasons for this change in the importance of the military's civil role are readily apparent, others are less so and therefore more significant. Also important are those factors which tend to indicate that this increased importance of the civil role may be occurring at the expense of other more traditional, and more directly military roles. An indicator of the fact that the civil role's significance may be increasing at the expense of another role, is the pattern of equipment purchases and intended purchases during the period.

²¹Defence Review 1978, p. 18.

²²Ibid., p. 19.

The major purchase during the 1970s has been the frigate HMNZS Canterbury. While this is obviously very much a piece of military hardware, it can also be seen as a means of patrolling New Zealand's economic zone. The most significant aspect of its purchase though, was that it was the fourth of what was planned to become by 1980 a six frigate naval force.²³ This force never eventuated, and in fact a planned replacement for the almost obsolete Otago has been postponed indefinitely.²⁴ So, rather than increase in size, the New Zealand navy is actually decreasing. By the mid 1980s the effective naval force will consist of two ships, the Canterbury and Waikato, in contrast to the four²⁵ ship navy at the start of the period. While it is true that present day ships possess a much greater fire power than their predecessors, there is no way that two warships can be as effective as four.

Apart from the Canterbury no other major purchases of solely military orientated equipment have been made during the seventies except for the Skyhawks and the recently announced Scorpions. The Skyhawks have never seen combat and would be very unlikely to survive any such encounter anyway. The Scorpions are of dubious value with the unlikelihood of anyone ever attacking New Zealand by tank, and their usefulness in any overseas campaign New Zealand may embark upon must also be questionable. The value therefore of solely military purchases must be questionable especially

²³ The Press, 9 August 1976.

²⁴ The Press, 31 January 1980.

²⁵ Report of the Ministry of Defence 1967, p. 24.

in contrast to the other equipment.

Virtually all the remaining purchases of equipment for the New Zealand armed forces have a direct civil value which is often greater than their military value. These include the Hercules, the Andovers, and also the twin engine helicopters being considered. It is interesting to note that one of the main reasons proposed in favour of these helicopters is that "such aircraft also offer potential for coastal fisheries protection and Antarctic support tasks."²⁶ The navy has purchased a research ship, hydrographic ship and four fisheries protection craft, but is unable to obtain the frigate it desires. The airforce has little likelihood of obtaining replacements for its Skyhawks but is about to revamp its Orions and has received the Andovers and just recently three Friendships.²⁷ These will be primarily used for transport purposes in which case they will benefit the civil community. The most suitable equipment for the army would include ground to air and surface to surface missiles, but its chances of getting these are so remote they do not even bother asking. They have, however, been able to obtain general purpose vehicles and radio equipment. It is therefore readily apparent that the decision whether or not to purchase certain equipment can be largely influenced by its civil value.

The reasons for this change of emphasis on the civil role are difficult to determine, however, it appears they

²⁶ Defence Review 1978, p. 40.

²⁷ The Press, 28 February 1980.

can be narrowed down to two and possibly three factors. These are the changing international situation with the lack of potential aggressors in the Pacific, and the changing economic situation with its associated problems for all spheres of New Zealand society. Another possible cause could be changes in the domestic political situation. A combination of no potential aggressor and a declining balance of payments means it is becoming increasingly difficult for New Zealand Governments to justify increases in defence spending, even if it is only required to maintain the existing level of capabilities. If it can be proven that new defence equipment has a valuable use in a non-military role then the chances of it being purchased are far greater. This being the main way in which both the military and the Government can justify defence expenditure.

This lack of finance, of course, is no new thing in defence planning. As early as 1967 the Defence Report reported that "the deferments of decisions on virtually all the major projects envisaged in the White Paper made necessary by the economic situation had inevitably set back the White Paper timetable."²⁸ This is still the story today. Even when New Zealand was involved in the war in Vietnam, the armed forces did not receive much additional funding, primarily because they used American equipment rather than having to provide their own. This factor is still important today in that it is probably correctly assumed that if New Zealand armed forces had to go to war overseas they w

²⁸ Report of the Ministry of Defence 1967, p. 2.

would be equipped with essential equipment and logistical support by their allies, most probably the United States. In the meantime only limited equipment is required for training purposes. Therefore, the lack of finance, coupled with the lack of any potential aggressor and the reliance on allies for logistical support provide major reasons for the relative increase in the non-military role at the expense of the other three.

One other reason for such a situation occurring could be possible changes in domestic political circumstances. Remembering of course that National was the Government from 1965 to 1972 and again from 1975 to 1980, with Labour having a three year term inbetween, National has traditionally had stronger concern for defence than Labour, and as a result of the 1972 election and the coming to power of the Labour Party, two major changes immediately took place. These were the withdrawal from South Vietnam of the last New Zealand troops and the ending of military conscription. The Labour years saw a reduction of defence spending as a percentage of Gross National Product and of Government expenditure.²⁹ Since then these figures have never again reached the same level as under the previous National Government. Mr Rowling has said "I've always believed that our armed forces could play a very useful peacetime role and should be equipped and trained to maximise their effort in this area."³⁰ He also said that "it is important to

²⁹Refer to p. 9.

³⁰John Henderson, an exclusive interview with the Leader of the Opposition, in International Review, September/October 1977, p. 6.

ensure they're not just sort of idling about the place."³¹ The Labour Party then appears devoted to maximising the use of the military for non-military functions. The National Party also seems similarly concerned³³ and overall it could appear that the general political consensus has moved in favour of greater utilisation of the armed forces and greater rationalisation of equipment purchases. This would of course have been influenced by the other two factors, lack of a potential aggressor and financial problems.

The trend, therefore, during this period has been for a move towards greater stress on the civil uses of the armed forces coupled with perhaps a lessening of emphasis on some of the other roles. While this may not have been an intentional shift it has nevertheless occurred. It looks like becoming an increasingly important aspect of all future defence considerations.

CONCLUSION

This concludes the study of New Zealand's defence situation during the past fifteen years. The whole question of defence as it exists in New Zealand has been looked at in relation to its four primary roles. This approach has revealed several significant factors and developments over the fifteen year period from 1965 to 1980. The object now is to interpret these changes, to see just why and how differing factors have influenced defence planning and policies during this period. In this way it is hoped that some indicator of future defence trends may become apparent.

The best way to approach this would be to briefly summarise the trends and changes within each of the four roles, alliance, territorial, regional and civil. As was seen more fully in Chapter Two, New Zealand relies almost completely on its allies for assistance in defence. Without the deterrent effect provided by the United States especially, New Zealand would be in a considerably weaker defence position. These days the major alliance is ANZUS with SEATO and the Five Power Defence Arrangements being less significant. Throughout the period in question New Zealand's contribution to our alliances has never been very great and the relationships have been essentially one sided as far as the actual contributions have been concerned. The reason for this is that there is no criteria set down concerning just how much each member

should be required to contribute to the alliance. New Zealand has therefore been able to remain a member of ANZUS while contributing very little to the alliance. If anything this fact has become even more apparent as the period has progressed.

It is hard to envisage any possible change in this situation without the advent of some direct threat to New Zealand's sovereignty. While the United States makes request for further contributions from their allies they show no signs of taking action when these requests are met by vague promises rather than specific commitments. Therefore while the alliance role has probably never been more significant to New Zealand, this has not been matched by any obvious signs of priority in terms of defence policies.

The territorial role is also one of crucial importance to any country. However in New Zealand it seems to receive less priority than some of the other roles. The feeling apparently being that the best means of providing for territorial defence is by retaining good allies. Adequate territorial defence is of course almost impossible to achieve, especially given New Zealand's limited resources and difficult geographical factors. This means that the question must be asked as to just how useful it is to provide partial territorial defence. It might be that no territorial defence at all is considered to be just as useful as only partial defence.

Whether this is in fact the case in New Zealand or not, the fact remains that territorial defence is

accorded very little effort in the overall scheme of defence. This has been the case throughout the period 1965 to 1980 and it appears to be becoming even more apparent during the latter stages of this period. Equipment purchased or approved, and policies enacted or proposed tend to show a declining interest in providing for territorial defence. Perhaps this is only to be expected in view of the impossibility of providing anything remotely adequate for New Zealand's needs.

The third role looked at was the regional role and it becomes apparent that this is an important part of New Zealand's total defence priorities. In the early part of this period the commitment to regional defence problems was best exemplified by involvement in the Vietnam crisis and earlier still in the Malaysian crisis. While the New Zealand presence in these two areas was relatively insignificant and required by our alliance commitments, it was sufficient to show that New Zealand views events in the Asian Pacific region with concern. One trend over the longer term and continuing during this period has been an almost complete detachment from all military developments on an international scale especially in Europe and a concentration on the more significant - at least in so far as New Zealand is concerned - local scene. New Zealand with her limited resources and capabilities is better off deploying these where they can be most useful. And that means the Asian Pacific and most especially the South Pacific region. There is no indication that the importance of the regional role is such that new equipment is being purchased with this in mind, nor

has there been any concerted effort to change overall defence strategies, however it does seem that the regional role has developed in importance even though the actual military presence has virtually ended.

The fourth role looked at was not directly concerned with actual defence activities but rather with the civil orientation of the armed forces. Armed forces have always been concerned to some extent with activities of a non-military nature due to their very position in society. This is no less true of New Zealand than of any other modern nation. In fact, the smaller the state the more important these non-military duties become. In times of disaster or emergency the military provide the only body of highly trained and well equipped men capable of responding in the correct manner. The armed forces are also especially useful in a country such as New Zealand in providing Search and Rescue and fisheries protection capabilities. During the period 1965 to 1980 the armed forces became increasingly involved in civil duties because of the need to utilize their resources most efficiently and because of the increasing importance of fisheries protection type duties. This role seems to be accorded a great deal of importance by the policy makers while at the same time being acknowledged as only of secondary importance in the armed forces' overall duties. One of the important features of the majority of the equipment purchased during this period has been its suitability for civil as well as military uses.

As far as the changing relative importance of the

four primary roles are concerned it is harder to describe a specific pattern during this period. As mentioned above the civil role to all intents and purposes appears to have gained in priority, but at the same time it could not be said that any other particular role has declined noticeably by comparison. The alliance role has maintained if not increased in importance due to New Zealand's peculiar situation in the world. At the same time the priority given to new developments in overall Government regional policy has resulted in continued importance being given to the military's part in this area. It does appear that perhaps the territorial defence aspects of the military's duties have suffered as a consequence of developments in other areas, and because of the relative impossibility of adequately fulfilling this role.

During the period 1965 to 1980 then some noticeable changes have occurred in New Zealand defence roles and policies, changes which will almost certainly have a significant influence on future New Zealand defence trends. The reasons for these changes or trends are probably many and varied, but it does appear that factors such as financial constraints and politically inspired changes have played a significant part. As was seen earlier various influencing factors in the international environment have also been important in decision-making related to defence policy. The difficult point is to decide which has been most important, the lack of finance or the changing international environment. In the past New Zealand has always shown that it will respond to a

deteriorating international situation by devoting more of its resources to defence regardless of the cost involved so it must be assumed that this would happen also in the event of any future military threat in the South Pacific or South East Asia area which directly involves New Zealand. The poor financial situation in New Zealand however has meant that New Zealand's defence commitments are probably less than they would be if this situation did not exist.

The important thing is to determine just what these factors mean as far as the adequacy or otherwise of New Zealand's defence resources are concerned. Both major political parties agree that New Zealand should continue to maintain its military resources with emphasis being placed on the development of a skilled base force of highly trained personnel rather than a build up of expensive equipment. What influence will this type of development have on New Zealand's military capabilities and to what extent has this become apparent during the period 1965 to 1980?

The massive cost of modern military equipment means it is not viable for a country in New Zealand's situation, therefore the policy has been to train personnel who will be able to operate modern equipment should the need arise. The assumption being that any such equipment will be provided by our allies the United States, since the lead up time in the ordering of new equipment is such that this option would not be viable. The consequences of not keeping up with new developments in military

technology and trying to exist with equipment that is in many cases almost obsolete could be disturbing for New Zealand. In a time when military equipment is becoming very complex New Zealand is continuing to operate out-dated equipment. This means that New Zealand's capabilities are declining in relation to other countries and also that the gap is becoming so great that the financial and technological possibilities of ever catching up with modern technology must be limited. New Zealand's defence spending has been declining relatively during this period, especially in the field of capital expenditure on new equipment. To purchase this equipment in the future is going to require a disproportionately higher expenditure. The likelihood of this expenditure being allowed by the Government without any direct threat existing is rather slim which means that any run-down in defence expenditure and development will have an exaggerated effect in the future. That is to say, that the frigate not purchased now for \$250 million is not likely to be purchased for \$500 million in five or six years. Therefore it can be seen as a dangerous precedent to lag behind other nations in the acquisition of new technologies, because in most cases the gap can never be bridged.

During the fifteen years between 1965 and 1980 it would be fair to say that New Zealand's military capabilities declined. The reasons for this were many-fold, lack of money, lack of a perceived threat, advances in other countries not matched in New Zealand and a more restrained approach by the politicians. The best

indicator of the changing view of defence can be seen in the changed perception of the armed forces civil role. As the active roles of the military decline the need becomes one of utilizing the resources tied up in this area. The best way of utilizing these resources is by deploying the military in functions helpful to the public good. In New Zealand this means that the image of the military in the eyes of the public has become one of a force specialising in fisheries protection, search and rescue, civil defence duties, and general public assistance duties. This could well be the first step in the gradual downgrading of the armed forces. While these civil duties are obviously essential they should be seen as developing along with the other roles of the armed forces rather than instead of these other roles. It would be true to say that the civil role has developed further than the other roles of the armed forces during this period.

The future development of the armed forces can take one of three courses. They can be downgraded completely with a limited force retained to provide the civil functions so necessary in any nation. They can continue as they are at present being left to drift behind developments overseas in which case they will eventually end up in a similar way to the first option. Or they can be maintained at such a level that they provide a viable deterrent to any small scale attack and a viable contribution as far as New Zealand's alliance commitments are concerned. This third option would require a substantially increased budget in the immediate future but once

a viable force has again been developed it could be maintained at an acceptable level. If the armed forces are left to drift as they are at present it will become almost impossible to return them to a satisfactory standard, should this policy then be adopted in the future. New Zealand's defence can therefore be seen to be at a turning point. During the period examined, various changes have occurred in the relative importance of the four key roles with the non-military role gaining to some extent at the expense of the others. A continuation of the trend during this period would see the active usefulness of the New Zealand armed forces decline to such an extent that they would become little more than a police and civil defence force by the end of the century if not before.

As mentioned in the introduction, this is perhaps not entirely disastrous as far as New Zealand's security is concerned, but unless some concrete decisions are made concerning the place and role of the armed forces within New Zealand society, then any future spending on defence is likely to be misguided and wasteful.

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